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I. Introduction
Recent developments in international trade theory have placed great
emphasis on the gains that might be obtained from the realization of scale
economies and increased product variety made possible by trade. The influx of
imports will improve the competitive environment for firms selling
domestically, requiring these firms either to lower production cost or shut
down and leave the industry. Trade can thus be expected to result in a
rationalization of the production process by increasing output per firm and
lowering average total cost.
In a policy context, the effect of trade liberalization on firm output
arises importantly in evaluating the U.S.-Canada free trade area. The
expectation is that tariff liberalization has the potential. to increase the
competitive environment in both countries, implying mutual realization of
scale advantages from trade.
The theoretical treatment of the implications of a tariff for firm
output, however, is inconclusive. For example, Horstmann and Markusen (1986),
using a one-factor two-country Cournot model with linear demand, find that a
tariff has no effect on output of domestic firms but raises firm output in the
partner country. The tariff increases a foreign firm's perceived elasticity
of demand, which leads to a reduction in the mark-up of price over marginal
cost and increased firm output. Flam and Helpman (1987), using an n-factor
two-good one-country model with monopolistically competitive firms facing
constant elasticity demand schedules find that a tariff raises industry output
but has an ambiguous effect on firm output. A tariff will increase the
utilization rate in the monopolistically competitive sector if R&D requires
highly specific resources which do not have good substitutes.
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The purpose of this paper is to explore systematically the determinants
of the output of a monopolistically competitive firm in response to a tariff
using a two-country two-good two-factor model which incorporates and extends
the results of Horstmann and Markusen and Flam and Helpman. On the production
side, a corollary to the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem is used to find that the
effect of a tariff on firm output depends on the factor-intensity ranking of
the protected industry. On the demand side, tariffs and changes in the terms
of trade affect firm output through the firm's perceived elasticity of demand.
These results are then used to demonstrate that, in most cases the forces
raising firm output in the home country imply falling firm output in the
partner country. Consequently, mutual scale advantages from bilateral tariff
elimination in the U.S.-Canada FTA are unlikely for monopolistically
competitive industries. A diagrammatic technique is also developed for
illustrating the general equilibrium effects of a tariff for this model.
The model is presented in section II. The effect of a tariff for firm
output and terms of trade is first evaluated assuming firms face a constant
elasticity demand curve in section III. The implications for allowing the
firm's perceived elasticity to vary are then discussed in section IV.
Conclusions follow.
II. Determinants of Output per Firm
For the purpose of evaluating the determinants of output per firm in
response to a tariff, consider a simple two-good, two-factor, two-country
model. Good one is homogeneous across firms and countries, produced with
capital and labor using constant returns to scale technology, and sold in a
perfectly competitive market. Good two is differentiated by firm. Production
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requires a fixed input of capital plus variable inputs of capital and labor. 1
The variable inputs are characterized by constant returns to scale but the
fixed input requirement gives rise to a downward sloping average total cost
curve (ATC). Firms in industry 2 set price as a profit-maximizing mark-up
over marginal cost, where the mark-up is inversely related to the firm's
perceived elasticity of demand. However, free entry is assumed so that price
is equal to average total cost.
There are three determinants of firm output in industry 2 in this model.
On the demand side, changes in the tariff and changes in the terms of trade
will affect each firm's perceived elasticity of demand. On the production
side, the factor intensity ranking of the two industries plays a key role in
determining firm output consistent with factor market equilibrium.
Turning first to the production side of the economy, the price in
industry 2 must be consistent with profit maximization, which implies that
MC2 = P2 [l - 11] (1)
where
MC2 = w aL2 + ra
is marginal cost in industry 2, w is the return to labor, r is the return to
capital, a.(w,r) is the variable unit input requirement of factor i in
industry j, and n>1 is a representative firm's perceived elasticity of demand
in industry 2. For the sake of brevity, country subscripts have been
1The assumption that capital is the only fixed factor is not essential
for the following results. It is sufficient for our purposes here that the
production function simply be nonihomothetic. That is, the fixed factor
proportions be different from the variable factor proportions.
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suppressed. Proportionately differentiating equation (1), using the
definition of marginal cost, yields
P2- 9L2 M + 2 M 7 + (1')
where 6ij is factor i's share of total cost in industry j, 2 is variable
capital's share of total cost in industry 2, M-P 2/MC2 is the mark-up of price
over marginal cost, and the circumflex indicates proportionate change.
Price in both sectors must also be consistent with the zero-profit
condition which requires that price equal average total cost for all firms.
That is
P1 =w aLl + r aKl (2)
P2 = w aL + r a2 + Fr(3)
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where F is the fixed capital input requirement in industry 2, and q2 is firm
output in industry 2. Proportionate differentiation of equations (2) and (3)
yields
- 6 2L O + 0K1 r (2')
and
P2- 0L2w + 0212 - F 2q (3')6L2 2
where 6O is fixed capital's share of total cost in industry 2.
Equations (1'), (2'), and (3') can be solved simultaneously for the
proportionate changes in w, r, and q2 which satisfy the zero-profit and
maximum-profit conditions in terms of prices and the firm's perceived
elasticity of demand:
M4e 14 (r;-1) e,
5
6L2 P2 P1 9 8
q2(-- + (5)
2 1v6M (r-1) e-
where e - 0L1 -K2 ~K1 0L2 and e - 6L1 K2 - 6K1 9L2
Equation (4) is simply a restatement of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem. A
rise in the relative price of good 2 requires a fall in w/r if industry 2 is
the capital intensive industry, ranked according to variable inputs. That is,
if eV is positive.
The implications of an increase in P2 for firm output in industry 2
depends on the factor intensity ranking of each industry, as well. An
increase in P2 requires an equal proportionate increase in ATC 2 , but no change
in ATC1 , in order to satisfy the zero-profits conditions in both sectors. An
increase in P2 must also be accompanied by an equal proportionate increase in
MC2 in order to satisfy the profit-maximization condition, as long as the
firm's perceived elasticity of demand is unchanged. That is
ATC 2 -MC 2 -P 2  and ATC1=P 1 =0.
What changes in w, r, and q2 will satisfy all three conditions? By the
Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, a fall in w/r will increase both ATC 2 and MC2
relative to ATCZ if industry 2 is capital intensive. However, a fall in w/r
alone will not satisfy both the zero-profits and maximum-profits conditions
for industry 2. For, as w/r falls, ATC2 rises faster than MC2 . This follows
from the fact that the fixed-capital input requirement in industry 2 implies
that capital's- share of total cost is greater than capital's share of variable
cost. Therefore, an increase in firm output in industry 2, which reduces
ATC2 , is also required.
If, on the other hand, industry 2 is the labor intensive industry, then
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w/r must rise. However, in this case, an increase in w/r will cause MC2 to
rise faster than ATC2 since labor's share of marginal cost is greater than
labor's share of total cost in industry 2. Therefore, a fall in firm output
in industry 2, which raises ATC2 , is required.
The implications for an increase in the firm's perceived elasticity of
demand for firm output, holding prices fixed, is more definitive, as can be
seen from the second term on the right hand side of equation (5). An increase
in a will increase q2 as long as industry 2's factor intensity ranking
according to its variable inputs corresponds to the factor intensity ranking
according to its total inputs. That is, as long as 8V > 0 <=> e > 0.
The larger the firm's perceived elasticity of demand the smaller the gap
between ATC2 and MC2 necessary to satisfy the profit-maximization condition.
If P1 and P2 are unchanged, MC1 and ATC 2 must also remain fixed to satisfy the
zero-profit condition. Therefore, the mark-up over marginal cost in industry
2 must be reduced entirely by raising MC2 . That is
ATC 2 =MC1 =P 2 =P 1 =0 and MC 2 > 0.
This is accomplished by increasing the return to the factor used intensively
in industry 2. However, if w/r is changed so that MC1 is held constant while
MC2 is increasing, then ATC2 must also be rising. Consequently, firm output
in industry 2 must also be rising to hold ATC2 equal to zero.
It is interesting to note, however, that if industry 2 is capital
intensive based on total inputs, so that e is positive, but industry 2 is the
labor intensive industry based on variable inputs, so that ey is negative,
then an increase in the firm's perceived elasticity of demand will lower firm
output. This case emerges if industry 2 requires a lot of fixed capital but
very little variable capital.
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As before, an increase in rn requires a smaller gap between MC2 and ATC 2.
However, if P2 is held constant then ATC2 cannot change. Therefore, the
adjustment must occur by increasing MC 2 . This requires an increase in w/r
since industry 2 is labor intensive in its variable inputs. The increase in
w/r, though, will lower ATC2 since industry 2 is capital intensive overall.
Thus, firm output must fall to raise ATC2 to its original level.
The production side is completed by adding the factors markets. Labor
market equilibrium is given by equation (6) and capital market equilibrium by
equation (7)
aLl Q1 + aL2 q2 n2 = L (6)
aK1 Q1 + a2 q2 n2 + n2 F -K (7)
where Q1 is output by industry 1, n 2 is the number of firms in industry 2, L
is the economy's endowment of labor, and K is the economy's endowment of
capital. Proportionate differentiation of (6) and (7) gives
ALl Q1 + AL2 (Q + n2) = 6L (W ° -r) (6' )
and
AK Q1+ AK (q 2 + n~2) + 42 n2 = S- (W - i) (7')
where &LXs AL OK1 &1+ AL26K 2, -K=AMlBL1uc1 +AK2L2 M 2 '
Agis the fraction of the endowment of factor j employed in industry i, and &i is
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in industry i.
Solving (6') and (7') simultaneously, using (4) and (5), we can find
output in industry 1 and the number of firms in industry 2 to be
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- A, [2 +OL2L 2 {M] P2  P1 ) 2 + L2 FK2
and
n ev M - AvOL2IM] (P2 - P1) + 1 vvF(9)
KZ
where A=AK2 AL1 - AKAL2 ' AV AL1 A1 AL2, iand i - 6L AKi + 6K A*Li
Output in industry 2 can be found by combining equations (5) and (9) to obtain
Q2 == +  v [ + M4 L0A+MB aF ](P - 1 ) +e [A 16 + eA A ] . (10)
It is clear from equations (8) and (10) that an increase in P2 relative
to P1 will increase production in industry 2 and reduce production in industry
1 as long as the factor intensity ranking based on total inputs agrees with
the factor intensity ranking based on variable inputs. However, if industry 2
is capital intensive overall (A > 0) but labor intensive based on variable
inputs (e9 < 0) then an increase in the relative price of good 2 will lower
industry 2 output and raise industry 1 output.
To see this point, recall that an increase in P 2 in the mixed intensity
case requires that w/r rise and q2 fall. If industry 2 is labor intensive
according to its variable input requirements, the increase in w/r and the fall
in q2 will generate an excess supply of labor and an excess demand for
capital. By the Rybczynski Theorem, output of the overall capital intensive
industry must fall and output of the overall labor intensive industry must
rise. Therefore, if industry 2 is capital intensive ranked according to total
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inputs, then industry 1 must expand and industry 2 must contract.
These results are summarized in Table 1. A +(-) entry indicates a non-
negative(positive) response of an endogenous variable to a change in relative
price or elasticity of demand necessary to maintain production-side
equilibrium. Results are presented for each of the three possible factor
intensity rankings.
On the demand side, we adopt the Dixit-Stiglitz-Spence form of the
utility function (Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Spence (1976)) of a
representative individual
U = D1o D2  (11)
where D1 is consumption of good 1 and D2 is a CES aggregate of the varieties
of good 2. Due to the symmetry of the CES function, domestic demand for a
representative domestic firm is
= - E2(12a)
n2H P22 + nF [P2F (l+t) ]
where E2 is domestic expenditure on good 2, Pza is the price of the domestic
variety of good 2, P2F is the price of the imported variety, n25 is the number
of domestic firms in industry 2, n2F is the number of foreign firms in
industry 2, t is the ad valorem tariff imposed by the home country on imports
of good 2, and o>1 is the elasticity of substitution among the varieties of
good 2. Similarly, the demand for good 2 produced by a representative foreign
firm is
D E[PFlt] (12b)
n25 P7 + n2 [ 2F(~)
1
The general equilibrium effect of a tariff on the utilization rate for
the case in which firms accurately calculate the elasticity of demand for
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their product is complex. Equilibrium will, therefore, first be illustrated
for the case in which each firm behaves as if its demand curve has constant
elasticity. The implications of variable elasticity of demand will be
discussed subsequently.
III. General Equilibrium with Constant Perceived Elasticity of Demand
General equilibrium for the case in which industry 2 is capital intensive
and the firm's perceived elasticity of demand is constant is depicted in
Figure 1, where P2F has been chosen as the numeraire. The first quadrant
determines equilibrium firm output and price for a representative domestic
producer in industry 2. q2a(P22aP1) is the set of combinations of firm output
and price in industry 2 which satisfy the supply side conditions in the home
country: profit maximization, zero profits, and factor market equilibrium.
q2H is increasing in P2H and decreasing in P1, as can be seen from the first
column of Table 1. Total demand (domestic plus exports) for a representative
domestic firm in industry 2 is given by DZa(P22;t), which is decreasing in P25
but increasing in the tariff, t.
All combinations of P2H and P1 which maintain equilibrium for a
representative domestic firm in industry 2 are depicted in quadrant IV by
E2 (t). An increase in P1 to P' will reduce q2H consistent with supply side
equilibrium, shifting q2H in quadrant I down. A change in P1 will have no
effect on demand for good 2 since the upper level of the utility function is
Cobb-Douglas. Therefore, P25 must rise to restore equilibrium, implying that
E2 is positively sloped.
The market for good 1 is depicted in quadrant III of Figure 1. Total
demand for good 1, D*1(P 1 ), is decreasing in P1 . Total supply of good 1,
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Q~i(P 1 ;P2H), is increasing in P1 and decreasing in Pe according to Table 1.
All combinations of P2H and P1 which maintain equilibrium in the market
for good 1 are given in quadrant IV by E1 . An increase in P2H to P25 relative
to P1 will reduce domestic production of Q1 , requiring an increase in P1 to
restore equilibrium in the market for good 1. This implies that E1 is
positively sloped, as well.
Consider, now a tariff increase by the home country. A tariff increase
from t to t' will have no effect on the q25 schedule in quadrant I, but will
increase demand for a representative domestic firm. An increase in P2H is
required to restore equilibrium, implying a rightward shift in E2 . The tariff
has no direct effect on the market for good 1 since the firm's perceived
elasticity of demand is held constant and the upper level of the utility
function is Cobb-Douglas. Therefore, the tariff increase by the home country
shifts equilibrium in quadrant IV from A to B, increasing P1 and P2 relative
to P2F'
What are the implications of the tariff for capacity utilization? The
increase in P1/P2F will lower firm output in the foreign country, according to
Table 1, thus lowering the utilization rate.
It is also possible to determine that firm output in the home country
will increase. Recall that the shift in equilibrium from A to B in quadrant
IV of Figure 1 corresponds to a rightward shift of Q* in quadrant III. The
adjustment in the market for good 1 from a to b involves a fall in demand for
good 1 since P1 is rising, an increase in foreign production of good 1 since
P1/Pr is rising, and therefore a fall in domestic production of good 1.
Domestic production of good 1 will fall if and only if P25 /Pi rises, according
to Table 1. Hence, q25 must also rise.
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The change in relative prices also constitutes an improvement in the
terms of trade for the home country for all patterns of trade. The increase
in Peg/P2F implies an improvement in the terms of trade within industry 2 for
the home country. The increase in Peg/P 1 is an improvement in the terms of
trade if the home country is a net exporter of good 2 and an importer of good
1 and the decline in P2F/P1 is an improvement in the terms of trade if the
home country is a net importer of good 2 and an exporter of good 1.
The effect of a tariff on the capacity utilization rate in industry 2 is
reversed if industry 2 is labor intensive ranked according to total and
variable factors. A tariff increase in the -home country will lower firm
output in the home country while raising firm output in the foreign country.
This case is depicted in Figure 2.
The labor intensive case differs from the capital intensive case in that
an increase in P2 /P 1 will lower firm output while raising total output in
industry 2, as can be seen from the third column in Table 1. Consequently,
q2H is decreasing in P2H and therefore negatively sloped in quadrant I. An
increase in P1 will raise q2H, requiring a fall in P2H to restore equilibrium.
Therefore,. E2 in quadrant IV, is negatively sloped as well.
2
The market for good 1 is diagrammed identically to the capital intensive
case, however the interpretation is slightly different. An increase in P2
will now reduce industry 1 output in the home country, increase industry 2
output in the home country, but reduce firm output in industry 2.
An increase in the home country tariff from t to t' increases total
demand for a representative firm in industry 2 in quadrant I, requiring an
2 If gqs is steeper than Dza, then E2 will be positively sloped. In this
case the tariff will reverse our results if E2 is steeper than E1 . Therefore,
the usual regularity assumptions are adopted.
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increase in Pz to restore equilibrium in the market for good 2. This
corresponds to a rightward shift in E2 in quadrant IV.
As in the capital intensive case, P1/P 2F, P22/P2F, and P2a/P1 all
increase as a result of the tariff, implying an improvement in the terms of
trade for the home country. However, according to Table 1, this change in
relative prices implies that the utilization rate in the home country is now
falling while the utilization rate in the foreign country is rising.
The case in which industry 2 is capital intensive based on total inputs
but labor intensive based on variable inputs is the only one in which a tariff
lowers firm output in both countries. The mixed factor intensity case is
diagrammed in Figure 3. Here, the distinguishing feature is that an increase
in P2/P 1 will lower both firm and industry output sector 2 and raise industry
1 output. Consequently, the market for industry 2 is diagrammed as in the
labor intensive case, but now the supply of industry 1 is decreasing in P1.
Moreover, an increase in P25 will also increase industry 1 output. Therefore,
Q* in quadrant III is negatively sloped, as is E1 in quadrant IV.
A tariff increase in the home country from t to t', will shift E2 to the
right. In the new equilibrium P1/PzF falls, P2H/P2F rises, and P1/PzH falls.
According to Table 1, the rise in the price of good 2 relative to the price of
good 1 in both countries implies that firm output in industry 2 must be
falling in both countries. Therefore, this is the only case in which tariff
liberalization will allow for the mutual realization of economies of scale.
Note also that the increase in the price of good 2 implies that total output
of industry 2 is contracting and industry 1 is expanding in the home country.
The terms-of-trade implications of the tariff are ambiguous. As before,
the home country's terms of trade within industry 2 improve. If the home
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country is also a net exporter of good 2 and an importer of good 1 then the
decline in P1 /P2u also constitutes an improvement in the home country's terms
of trade. However, if the home country is a net importer of good 2 and an
exporter of good 1 then the decline in P1/P2F implies a deterioration in the
inter-industry terms of trade.
IV. General Equilibrium with Variable Elasticity of Demand
Results presented above will be confounded by changes in the firm's
perceived elasticity of demand. The elasticity of demand facing a
representative domestic firm for sales in the domestic market can be
calculated from the demand system to be
(1-c) PI-'
? - + _(13a)n. P + n2F [P2F(l+t)]
and the elasticity of demand facing a representative foreign firm for sales to
the domestic market is
(1-a) [P2F(l+t)]1(37F - Q + 1a(13b)
F P2, + n2F P2F(1+t)]
Similar equations apply for firms selling in the foreign market. The
elasticity of demand for home country sales to the foreign market and foreign
sales to the foreign market can be found by setting t=O in equations (13a) and
(13b), respectively.
Note that a representative domestic firm's perceived elasticity of demand
for both national markets, r*(PzaP2F, t), is increasing in P2H, decreasing in
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P2F, and decreasing in t.3 An increase in the landed price of imports reduces
the competition perceived by home country suppliers in the domestic market and
an increase in the price of foreign goods in the foreign market reduces the
competition perceived by home country suppliers for their exports. These
price and tariff changes have the opposite effect on the foreign supplier.
The perceived elasticity of demand for a representative foreign firm,
?*(P 2H,P2Ft), is decreasing in the price of the home good, increasing the
price of the foreign good, and increasing in t.
Under the conditions described below, the relative price effects of a
tariff discussed in section III will carry over to the variable elasticity of
demand case. General equilibrium for the case in which industry 2 is capital
intensive and firms accurately perceive the elasticity of demand as variable
is depicted in Figure 4, where P2F has again been chosen as the numeraire.
The first quadrant determines equilibrium firm output and price for a
representative domestic producer in industry 2. q 2H(P2 ;P 1 ,t) is the set of
combinations of firm output and price in industry 2 which satisfy the supply
side conditions in the home country: profit maximization, zero profits, and
factor market equilibrium. q2g is increasing in P2. for two reasons. First,
as can be seen from Table 1, the direct effect of an increase in P2H is
positive. Second, an increase in P2H will raise a domestic firm's perceived
elasticity of demand, which in turn will raise firm output.
Total demand for a representative domestic firm in industry 2 is given by
3 Here we have not taken into account the change in the number of firms on
the firm's perceived elasticity of demand. An increase in t, a fall in P2H,
or an increase in P2F will all raise r", raising the number of firms at home,
while lowering q*, lowering the number of foreign firms. As a result, the
total number of competitors is unlikely to change, leaving the firm's
perceived elasticity of demand unaffected. Therefore, this channel is
ignored.
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Deg and is decreasing in P2g. According to equation (12a), Pza will reduce
Deg both directly and by changing the number of domestic firms. An increase
in Pm will increase the number of domestic firms necessary for supply side
equilibrium, which will lower the market share of each individual firm. 4 (In
addition, an increase in P2 raises the domestic producer's demand elasticity
thereby raising the number of domestic firms, while lowering the foreign
producer's demand elasticity thereby lowering the number of foreign firms. On
balance, the market share of an individual domestic firm is unlikely to be
altered importantly through the elasticity channel, and so is ignored here and
in future occurrences.)
All combinations of P2H and P1 which maintain equilibrium for a
representative domestic firm in industry 2 are depicted in quadrant IV by
E2 (t). According to Table 1, an increase in P1 to P1 ' will reduce qza,
shifting q25 in quadrant I down. An increase in P1 will also raise the demand
for good 2 by reducing the number of domestic and foreign firms. 5 Therefore,
an increase in P1 requires an increase in P2 in order to maintain equilibrium
in the market for a representative variety of good 2, so that E2 is positively
sloped.
4 As can be seen from Table 1, it is unclear how a change in P2H will
affect the number of domestic firms. As discussed in the text, the increase
in P2H requires a fall in w/r and an increase in q2g to satisfy the zero-
profit and maximum-profit conditions. The fall in w/r will create an excess
demand for labor. According to the Rybczynski theorem, a shift in resources
toward production of the capital intensive good (good 2) is required.
However, the increase in q25 has an ambiguous impact on the factor markets.
If ag/aL 2 >K/L then the increase in q21 creates a relative excess demand for
capital, requiring a shift in resources away from the production of the
capital intensive good (good 2). If the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor is large enough (specifically, if &2>1{) then the factor-
price effect will dominate and the number of firms in industry 2 will rise.
5 See footnote 4.
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A tariff increase by the home country on imports of good 2 from t to t'
will affect E 2 first by lowering the domestic firm's perceived elasticity of
demand, thereby lowering firm output. On the demand side, a tariff will shift
demand toward domestic firms so that Px must rise. 6  Thus, a tariff increase
will shift E2 to the right.
Equilibrium in the market for good 1 is depicted in quadrant III of
Figure 4. Total demand for good 1, D*, is decreasing in P1 . Demand for good
1 is independent of other prices and the tariff since the upper level of the
utility function has been chosen to be Cobb-Douglas. Total supply of good 1,
Q*(P1;P2x), is increasing in P1.
All combinations of P2H and P1 which maintain equilibrium in the market
for good 1 are depicted in quadrant IV by E1 . P2x has two effects on the
supply of good 1. From Table 1, the direct effect of an increase in P2x
reduces Q1 . An increase in P2x will also raise the perceived elasticity of
demand for domestic firms in industry 2 but lower the perceived elasticity of
demand for foreign firms in industry 2. Thus, output by industry 1 at home
will tend to. fall while output by industry 1 in the foreign country will rise.
Here, we will assume that, overall, industry output falls when P2x rises,
requiring an increase in P1 to maintain equilibrium in the market for good 1.
Therefore, E1 is positively sloped, as well. E1 has been drawn more steeply
than E2 in Figure 4. However, this choice makes no difference for the
following analysis.
A change in the tariff will have an ambiguous effect on the supply of
6The tariff will also lower a domestic firm's perceived elasticity of
demand, lowering the number of domestic firms, but raise the perceived
elasticity of demand for foreign firms, raising the number of foreign firms.
These two effects have an ambiguous impact on the total number of firms and
therefore an ambiguous impact on the market share of an individual firm.
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good 1. The tariff lowers the perceived elasticity of demand of domestic
firms raising industry 1 output, but raises the perceived elasticity of
foreign firms, lowering output of good 1. We will assume here that the
increase in output in the home country will be balanced by a fall in output in
the foreign country, so that Q* is not affected by the tariff. Therefore, the
position of E1 in quadrant IV is not affected by the tariff.
Overall, the tariff imposed by the home country will shift equilibrium in
quadrant IV from point A to point B. It is immediately apparent that P1/P2F
and P2H/P2F will rise. It can also be determined from quadrant III that
P2E/Pi will also rise. 7
The labor intensive case is analyzed in Figure 5. This case differs from
the capital-intensive case only with respect to the shape of q25 in the first
quadrant. This schedule may be positively or negatively sloped. According to
Table 1, an increase in P2 will lower firm output if industry 2 is relatively
labor intensive. However, an increase in P2 will also raise the domestic
firm's perceived elasticity of demand, increasing firm output. Consequently,
E2 could be positively or negatively sloped. This distinction, however, makes
no difference for the determination of equilibrium prices. A tariff increase
will shift E2 to the right in either case.
It is clear from quadrant IV of Figure 5 that the tariff will again
increase P1/P2F, 2H/P2F, and P21/P 1 . The tariff and terms-of-trade effects
will have the same impact on firm output as for the capital-intensive case.
7Recall that the movement from A to B in quadrant IV corresponds to the
right-ward shift of Q* in quadrant III. The adjustment in the market for good
1 involved a fall in industry 1 output in the home country as the result of an
increase in P2H/Pi, a fall-in demand for good 1 as the result of an increase
in P1 , and an increase in industry 1 output in the foreign country as the
result of an increase in P1 .
19
However, the change in domestic relative prices will not. The increase in
P1/P2F will raise firm output in the foreign country, while the increase in
P2H/1 will lower firm output in the home country.
There are three channels through which these relative price changes
affect firm output: the domestic relative price effect, the tariff effect,
and the terms of trade effect. Results for each factor intensity ranking are
summarized in Table 2. In each case the change in relative prices and the
direction of each of the three effects on firm output in industry 2 are
reported.
Consider first the capital intensive case. If the firm is perceiving a
constant elasticity of demand, the increase in P2 a/Pi will increase both
industry output and firm output in industry 2, while lowering industry 1
output in the home country. On the other hand, for the foreign country, the
increase in P1/PzF will lower industry and firm output in industry 2 and
increase industry 1 output. Thus, the tariff leads to rationalization in the
home country but de-rationalization in the foreign country.
However, this will not necessarily be the case if the firm's perceived
elasticity of demand also changes. The tariff effect raises the price of
imports relative to the home good in the home country market which lowers the
domestic firm's perceived elasticity of demand. The tariff, then, reduces the
market power of foreign producers in the home country market, and thus has an
anti-competitive effect on domestic producers, causing firm output to fall.
The tariff has the opposite effect on foreign producers. An increase in
the home country's tariff raises the elasticity of demand for imports in the
home country as perceived by foreign exporters. Thus, the tariff has a pro-
competitive effect on foreign suppliers, increasing output per firm.
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Changes in the terms of trade work against the tariff effect on the
firm's perceived elasticity of demand. The increase in PZ/P 2 . raises the
elasticity of demand for domestic firms on their exports but lowers the
elasticity of demand for foreign firms on their sales in their own market.
Therefore, the terms-of-trade effect of the tariff will stimulate
rationalization in the home country but lead to a fall in output per firm in
the partner country.
In the labor intensive case the change in relative prices is identical to
that of the capital intensive case. As a result, the terms of trade and the
tariff effects have the same implications for firm output as previously.
However, the domestic relative price effect works to reduce domestic firm
output and increase foreign firm output.
V. Conclusions
This paper has explored theoretically the general equilibrium
determinants of firm output in a monopolistically competitive industry and has
found that the capacity utilization rate depends on relative domestic prices,
the terms of trade, tariffs, and the factor-intensity ranking of industries.
On the production side, a corollary of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem was used
to determine that an increase in the price of the monopolistically competitive
good, relative to other goods in the economy, will raise the utilization rate
if the monopolistically competitive industry is capital intensive ranked
according to its variable factor inputs, but lower the utilization rate if
labor intensive ranked according to its variable factor inputs. A tariff will
generally raise the relative price of the monopolistically competitive good in
the home country relative to the competitive good, while having the opposite
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effect on the partner. Therefore, firm output will rise(fall) in the home
country and fall(rise) in the partner country if the monopolistically
competitive industry is unambiguously capital(labor) intensive.
Firm output falls in both countries as a result of the tariff only if the
monopolistically competitive industry is labor intensive when ranked according
to its variable inputs but capital intensive ranked according to total inputs.
In this case, the relative price of the monopolistically competitive good
rises in both countries and firm output falls. This case is also marked by
the fact that output of the protected industry declines, while output of the
unprotected industry expands.
On the demand side, a tariff, which raises the landed price of imports in
the home country, is anti-competitive for domestic firms and pro-competitive
for foreign firms, altering each firm's perceived elasticity of demand. As a
result, firm output will fall in the home country and rise in the foreign
country if and only if an industry's factor intensity ranking based on
variable inputs agrees with the factor intensity ranking based on total
inputs. On the other hand, the tariff will improve the intra-industry terms
of trade for the home country, thus raising the landed price of imports in the
foreign country as well. Therefore, the terms-of-trade effect works against
the tariff effect in determining firm output.
The likely rationalization effects of the U.S.-Canada FTA can be
considered in light of the theoretical results presented here. On the demand
side, Canada's relatively deep tariff reductions will be pro-competitive for
Canadian firms and anti-competitive for U.S. firms, stimulating
rationalization in Canada but not the United States. Tariff reductions by the
United States on Canadian exports, however will be anti-competitive for
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Canadian firms, lowering firm output. Canada's terms of trade are also likely
to deteriorate, further lowering firm output in Canada. On the production
side, changes in the price of capital will play a role in determining the
utilization rate. If the return to capital rises, then firm output is likely
to rise as well.
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TABLE 1
EFFECT OF RELATIVE PRICE AND ELASTICITY ON
RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND FACTOR PRICES
Industry 2
K Intensive
e > 0 e > 0
Industry 2
L Intensive
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